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I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium Essay tackles a single doctrinal conundrum at the Intellectual
Property and Federalism interface: what standard should courts use to assess
whether a state law that weakens federal patent rights is preempted by federal
patent law? The Federal Circuit has held that the proper standard is statutory
preemption, and specifically “implied conflict” preemption. This analysis requires
assessing whether a particular state law interferes with the “purposes and
objectives” of the Patent Act. If a court decides the state law interferes with
patent law’s goals, it is preempted; otherwise, it is not preempted.
My view is that the Federal Circuit has it wrong. The source of preemption
when a state passes a law that weakens a federal patent right is the Intellectual
Property Clause itself. This analysis does not look to Congressional intent to
preempt state law. Rather, it asks whether the state has excessively burdened
the exclusive right “secured” by Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, by imposing a compliance cost on patentees that is unreasonably high
in comparison to the gravity and scope of the problem the state seeks to
address. If, after hearing the evidence, a court finds the state law imposes
unreasonably high compliance costs on patentees, the law is preempted by the
Intellectual Property Clause; otherwise, the law is not preempted by the
Intellectual Property Clause.1
In this Essay, I explain the issue of patent preemption and how it arises in
patent law and practice. I define “state anti-patent laws” and distinguish them
from state patent laws or state “patent-like” rights such as trade secrets. I
describe how courts should determine preemption in this context, drawing both
on logic and on how courts did so historically. I then lay out the Federal
Circuit’s current approach to preemption of state anti-patent laws and show
how it is flawed. I hypothesize that the Federal Circuit’s erroneous conception
of the preemptive effect of federal patent law on state anti-patent laws helps
explain why the Federal Circuit has turned to “Petitioning Immunity” under the
First Amendment in order to protect patentees from state law liability.2 I end
by concluding that when addressing state anti-patent laws, as opposed to state
patent-like rights, courts should return to the correct preemption standard
based on the Intellectual Property Clause.

1 Obviously, the state law could still be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it directly
conflicts with a particular provision of the Patent Act. See Part V.
2 This trend has been observed by other scholars such as Professor Paul Gugliuzza. See Part VII.
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II. PATENT PREEMPTION GENERALLY
The United States has a dual system of governance in which the states and
the federal government share power.3 “Preemption” describes a situation in
which federal law supersedes state law, leading to the state law’s invalidation or
prohibiting its enforcement in a particular case.4 The main legal basis for
preemption is the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which provides that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.5
As the phrasing of the Supremacy Clause suggests, there are several different
types of preemption. Preemption can arise from the Constitution itself. For
example, the Naturalization Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 has been
held to have some preemptive effect on state laws with respect to naturalization
and immigration policy.6 In a more nuanced fashion, the Supreme Court has
held that the Commerce Clause implicitly preempts certain state laws that
unduly interfere with interstate commerce even absent congressional action.7
But most preemption today is statutory. Courts generally presume states
possess concurrent authority under the Constitution unless Congress acts in

3 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584 (2009) (“Under this federalist system, ‘the States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed
by the Supremacy Clause.’ ”) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt,
493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).
4 On preemption generally, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225–29 (2000).
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization . . . .”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (“[T]he
supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over
immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution, was pointed out
by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has since been given continuous recognition by this
Court.”).
7 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
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some manner to preempt state law.8 Statutory preemption can occur in several
ways. The first is by express preemption, where Congress expressly holds
within a particular federal statute that state law is preempted.9 The second type
of statutory preemption is implied preemption. This is where a court
determines that Congress implicitly intended to preempt a certain state law, or a
certain field of state law, even if it did not do so expressly. In other words,
courts “expand [the preemptive effect of] federal statutes beyond their [express]
terms through doctrines of implied preemption.”10
One clear example of implied preemption is where state law directly conflicts
with a federal law—for instance, where a state law prevents someone from doing
something that the federal government has given them a right to do. This is
sometimes called “actual conflict” preemption.11 On the other hand, when there
is no direct collision between state and federal law, courts may instead apply what
is called “purposes and objectives” preemption. This is where a court finds that
Congress must have intended to preempt a state law because—in the court’s
assessment—the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”12
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE PATENTS AND STATE “PATENT-LIKE” RIGHTS
Preemption arises in patent law in several distinct circumstances. The most
oft-discussed situation is when a state creates an incentive to innovate that takes
8 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
preemption case.” (citation omitted)).
9 An example is the copyright law’s preemption provision, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). See Guy A.
Rub, A Less-Formalistic Copyright Preemption, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 331, 333 (2017).
10 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
11 Id. at 624 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under these principles, the sole question is whether there is
an ‘actual conflict’ between state and federal law; if so, then pre-emption follows automatically by
operation of the Supremacy Clause.”); see also id. at 624, n.14 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
210 (1824)).
12 As Justice Thomas explains,
[t]he Court first formulated its current “purposes and objectives” pre-emption
standard in Hines [v. Davidowitz] when it considered whether the federal Alien
Registration Act pre-empted an Alien Registration Act adopted by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Court did not find that the two statutes,
by their terms, directly conflicted. Nonetheless, the Court determined that it
was not confined to considering merely the terms of the relevant federal law in
conducting its pre-emption analysis. Rather, it went on to ask whether the state
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 594–95 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also Nelson, supra note
4, at 226–29.
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the form of, or at least resembles, a patent right—a right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling a particular innovation.13
The obvious example is where a state creates a “state patent” that expressly
gives the owner the right to exclude others within the state’s jurisdiction.14
Such a state patent would likely be preempted today, assuming it gave inventors
the right to exclude others from inventions that would not otherwise meet
federal patentability standards.15 The reason is that the Supreme Court held in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc. that a Florida law that prohibited
copying of publicly known subject matter that was ineligible for federal patent
protection was preempted by federal patent law pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause, after reasoning that it interfered with the objectives of patent law.16 The
state law effectively operated as a “patent-like” right against the world and yet
did not adhere to federal patentability standards. Thus, inventors might be
deterred from applying for federal patents and from inventing things Congress
deemed patentable and worth protecting.17
That said, the Supreme Court has held, in Goldstein v. California, that the
Intellectual Property Clause itself does not fully prevent states from passing
laws designed to promote innovation, even when those laws employ similar
mechanisms to patent or copyright.18 In other words, other forms of state
“patent-like” rights are not necessarily preempted.
13 On preemption of state intellectual property law generally, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The
Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
265 (Shram Rrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). See also Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and
the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991). On preemption of state patents
specifically, see Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN.
L. REV. 487, 524–31 (2013). On preemption of state trade secret laws specifically, see Douglas
Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693, 693
(1997); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law
to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299 (2008).
14 States once granted patents but no longer do so. See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent
Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2013).
15 See Camilla A. Hrdy, Dissenting State Patent Regimes, 3 IP THEORY 78, 81–82 (2013) (proposing
state patent regimes with less protection than federal patents); Hrdy, supra note 13, at 509–14
(proposing re-introducing state patents as innovation incentives).
16 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (“By offering
patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the present federal scheme, the
Florida statute conflicts with the ‘strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which
do not merit patent protection.’ We therefore agree with the majority of the Florida Supreme
Court that the Florida statute is preempted by the Supremacy Clause, and the judgment of that
court is hereby affirmed.” (citing Lear Inc., 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969))).
17 Id. at 160–61.
18 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552–61 (1973) (addressing preemption by
copyright law of a state law protecting otherwise unprotectable sound recordings); id at 560
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More subtle examples of state “patent-like” rights that might potentially be
preempted by federal patent law include a state trade secret statute that
prohibits misappropriation of privately held secrets. In this circumstance, the
Supreme Court has reached the opposite conclusion—that state law is not
necessarily preempted even though it may lead inventors to keep unpatentable
as well as patentable inventions secret. In Kewanee v. Bicron, the Supreme Court
assessed whether Ohio’s trade secret law was preempted by federal patent law
and decided it was not preempted because of the ways in which a trade secret
right is not like a patent. It does not prohibit use of protected information that
is derived through reverse engineering or independent creation. It does not
give the trade secret owner an exclusive right “against the world.” It only gives
them a private right of action against those who misappropriate the information
by using improper means or breaching a duty of confidence.19 Thus, the Court
reasoned, it was unlikely that many inventors of patentable inventions would be
deterred from inventing patentable inventions and choosing to disclose and
protect them under the Patent Act.20 “[T]he possibility that an inventor who
believes his invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on
trade secret law . . . is remote indeed.”21
The upshot of these types of cases is that when a state grants an incentive to
innovate that resembles a patent, the law may or may not be preempted,
depending on how much it resembles a patent. If a state provides the same
exclusionary protection as a federal patent—a right to an injunction against
anyone, even those who obtained the innovation through independent
development or reverse engineering—preemption is basically inevitable under
Bonito. But if a state instead merely provides an alternative way to protect
innovation without creating a broadly applicable right to exclude—such as a
(concluding that “under the Constitution, the States have not relinquished all power to grant to
authors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.” (internal quotations omitted)).
19 Kewanee v. Bircon, 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974) (“Trade secret law provides far weaker
protection in many respects than the patent law.”). Other examples of state “patent-like” rights
that might be preempted include where a state contract protects an invention from use by another
even though a federal patent on it is denied, see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257
(1979) (holding federal patent law does not preempt state contract law from requiring payment of
royalties to a patent applicant, on sales of articles embodying the patentee’s invention, for so long
as the contracting party sells those articles, even if the patent is never granted), or where state
trademark and unfair competition laws effectively extend the life of an expired patent by allowing
the patentee to continue to enjoin others from using the design. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964).
Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 552–61 (1973) (addressing preemption by copyright law
of a state law protecting otherwise unprotectable sound recordings).
20 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 490.
21 Id.
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remedy against employees who reveal their employer’s secrets to competitors—
this will not be preempted under Kewanee.
IV. STATE ANTI-PATENT LAW DEFINED
A distinct situation in which the issue of preemption arises in patent law is
when a state, by legislative enactment or through common law, directly attacks
the validity or enforceability of a federal patent, or significantly reduces the
ability of patentees to profit from their patents.22 I call this latter type of law
“state anti-patent law.”23
State anti-patent laws are not a novel phenomenon, and have their origins in
the nineteenth century.24 As historian Chris Beauchamp has documented, there
was a tremendous amount of patent litigation in the nineteenth century.25 To
address complaints from farmers and others that believed they were being
unjustly accused of infringement, states passed laws seeing to regulate patent
assertions.26 For instance, some states passed laws requiring that anyone who
sought to sell or license patent rights in the jurisdiction to obtain a license and
prove their “good moral character,” and to pay a high tax—double that of the
ordinary tax imposed on sellers of other goods.27 Several states passed laws that
prohibited selling or licensing patents in the state without first filing copies of

22 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015); Roger Allan
Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 551; see also Camilla A. Hrdy, What is
Happening in Vermont? Patent Law Reform from the Bottom Up, PATENTLY-O, https://patentlyo.com/pat
ent/2013/05/what-is-happening-in-vermont-patent-law-reform-from-the-bottom-up.html (May 27,
2013) (discussing VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197).
23 I specifically define a state anti-patent law as any state law, common law or statute, that
directly attacks the validity or enforceability of a federal patent, or significantly reduces the ability
of patentees to profit from their patents. That said, I am not the first to use the term “state antipatent law.” See, e.g., Ford, supra note 22, at 555.
24 I discuss the history of state anti-patent laws in depth in Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of
State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133 (2018).
25 Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848 (2016).
26 Hugo E. Weisberger, State Control Over Patent Rights and Patented Articles, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
183 (1938).
27 For instance, a Kentucky statute declared that “all itinerant persons vending lightning rods,
patent rights or territory for the sale, use or manufacture of patent rights” were to be deemed
“peddlers,” and that they must obtain a “license” from the county court of each county in which
they wished to sell patents. See In re Sheffield, 64 F. 833, 833–34 (C.C. D. Ky. 1894). This
required them to prove they were of “good moral character” and to pay a “license tax” of double
the $100 tax imposed on peddlers of ordinary goods, merchandise, or other property, to the state,
and one-fourth that sum to each county in which patent peddlers sought a license.
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authenticated patents with the clerk of the counties in which they wished to
license.28
These laws changed form, but did not entirely disappear. Modern examples
of state anti-patent laws include state unfair competition counterclaims brought
against losing patentees in patent infringement trials based on the patentee’s
aggressive pre-litigation infringement assertions;29 stand-alone state antitrust
claims premised on a patentee’s fraudulent procurement of a patent from the
Patent Office and subsequent enforcement of the patent against the plaintiff;30
and “bad faith patent assertion” laws enacted in most states since May 2013.
These laws typically give recipients of demand letters the opportunity to sue
patentees in state court for damages and injunctions.31
V. STATE ANTI-PATENT LAW DISTINGUISHED
There has been significant scholarship on preemption of state laws of the
first variety—that is, preemption of state laws like trade secrets that resemble
federal patents.32 But scholarship on preemption of state anti-patent law was
rare until quite recently when Vermont passed a law prohibiting bad faith
assertions of patent infringement in May 2013.33
28 For instance, an Indiana statute entitled, “An act to regulate the sale of patent rights, and to
prevent frauds in connection therewith,” made it unlawful for any person to “sell or barter, or
offer to sell or barter, any patent right in any county in the state,” without first filing copies of the
patent with the clerk of said counties that had been “duly authenticated,” and “swearing to an
affidavit before such clerk that such letters patent are genuine and have not been revoked or
annulled, and that he has full authority to sell or barter the right so patented.” Ex parte Robinson,
20 F. Cas. 961, 963 (C.C.D. Ind. 1870).
29 Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (tortious
interference with economic advantage counterclaims based on patentee’s false statements to
customers that defendant had infringed plaintiff’s patent and was incapable of producing a noninfringing product).
30 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(multi-district litigation in which plaintiffs, direct and indirect purchasers of a patented drug,
brought state antitrust and other claims against patentee based on patentee’s fraudulent
procurement of patent from Patent Office and subsequent enforcement).
31 See citations supra note 21. Many states have copied Vermont’s model. See VT. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 9, § 4197; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1590–94. See also Andrew Baluch & Jason Mock,
Survey of State Laws Against Bad-Faith Patent Assertion, BLOOMBERG BNA, Aug. 27, 2014. For more
updates on state anti-troll bills, see http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislationguides/patent-progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/.
32 See supra note 13.
33 See citations in supra note 22. See also Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment & Patents:
The Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 30 (2015). Student notes on whether the new
state patent assertion laws are preempted include T. Christian Landreth, Recent Development,
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We might assume the preemption rules governing these two types of state
laws—state patent-like laws, on the one hand, and state anti-patent laws, on the
other—are the same. After all, in both cases, states are acting, we might say
“regulating,” in the area of patents, and thereby creating a potential conflict
between state and federal goals.
In his recent article on the new bad faith patent assertion laws, Professor
Paul Gugliuzza describes the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence respecting
preemption of state law counterclaims and explains how this case law is or
might be applied to the new state bad faith patent assertion laws. In his view,
“state laws regulating patent enforcement” ought to be addressed under an
“orthodox, Supremacy Clause-based preemption analysis”—the same analysis
used to assess state trade secret laws and state patent-like rights.34 Under this
standard, he contends, state laws that regulate patent enforcement “likely avoid
preemption. Although [they] create some disuniformity in the patent system,
they arguably do not conflict with the core objectives of federal patent law, such
as incentivizing invention and inducing the disclosure of inventions.”35 In other
words, Gugliuzza assumes that the same preemption standard applies to both
state patent law and state anti-patent law.36
However, the two types of laws—state patent-like laws and state anti-patent
laws—are in fact quite different. In the case of a patent-like right, states seek to
reward and incentivize an innovator by conferring a legal right that confers
some degree of exclusivity of use.37 By creating a separate exclusive right or
expanding the rights of innovators to protect their innovations, the state
potentially interferes with federal law either by leading inventors to apply for
fewer patents and disclosing their inventions to the public, or by removing
The Fight Against “Patent Trolls”: Will State Law Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 100,
120, 131 (2014) (arguing the Vermont law is not preempted and proposing Congress adopt a
similar law); Ryan DeSisto, Note, Vermont vs. the Patent Troll: Is State Action a Bridge Too Far?, 48
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015) (applauding Vermont’s attempt to deter patent trolling and
recommending the passage of current pending federal legislation).
34 Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1584–85, 1605–06 (assessing new bad faith assertion laws
according to the same standard articulated in Kewanee and Bonito).
35 Id. at 1584–85.
36 To be fair, Professor Gugliuzza notes that the implied conflict preemption case law is not
actually directly on point for assessing state anti-patent law. Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1603
(“To be sure, none of these Supreme Court cases [namely, Kewanee and Bonito Boats] involved state
laws regulating patent enforcement. But the structure of the Court’s analysis—examining the
policies behind the patent-related state law and weighing it against the policies embodied in
federal patent law—is plainly relevant to the question of whether federal patent law preempts
state laws regulating patent assertions.”).
37 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974) (“Certainly the patent policy of
encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive to invention.”).
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subject matter from the public domain that Congress wishes to remain free to
use.38 For example, an inventor intending to obtain a federal patent eventually
might instead choose to rely on secrecy or might initially rely on secrecy and
then thereafter get a patent.39 Either scenario may interfere with the goals of
patent laws to promote innovation and disclosure of new ideas and preserve the
public domain. But it interferes with the patent right itself only indirectly, if at all.
In contrast, in the case of state anti-patent laws, states challenge the validity
of a federal patent or constrain the ability of the patentee to enforce the patent.
State anti-patent laws pose a preemptive conflict that is far more direct and
guaranteed than that posed by state innovation incentives because they have the
effect of directly weakening the rights of a patent owner. Take the most basic
example: a state law that prohibits enforcing a federal patent in the state without
first obtaining a license. Here, a state has directly subtracted from the bundle of
rights the patentee would otherwise have had under federal law. Before the
state law, the patentee could license its patents in every state in the country.
Now, it cannot do so without first paying a fee to the state. Another example,
more relevant today, are bad faith assertion laws or tort counterclaims brought
against a patentee based on her overly zealous infringement assertions. These
expose the patentee to liability for trying to enforce the patent. Again, the state
has taken away something from the patentee that she would otherwise have—a
less restricted right to enforce.
The crucial implication of this distinction for preemption purposes is that
the Supreme Court’s statements in Kewanee, and before that in Goldstein v.
California—that the Intellectual Property Clause itself does not preempt states
from creating “patent-like” incentives such as trade secrets—does not apply to
preemption of state anti-patent laws.40 Rather, the Intellectual Property Clause
itself creates a preemptive barrier against state anti-patent laws.
VI. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE’S PREEMPTIVE EFFECT ON
STATE ANTI-PATENT LAW
In her essay, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, Professor Jeanne
Fromer argued that, although the Supreme Court foreclosed the notion of a
“Dormant IP Clause” in Goldstein, the Intellectual Property Clause can
38 Id. at 484–92 (discussing whether inventors “will refrain because of the existence of trade secret
law from applying for patents, thereby depriving the public from learning of the invention”).
39 Metallizing Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) (stating
one who “competitive[ly] exploit[s]” a secret invention at a time that precedes the filing of a
patent application on that invention by a year or longer forfeits the right to the patent).
40 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 552–61 (1973); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489–90.
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nonetheless provide a non-binding guide for thinking about preemption.41 This
may well be true for state laws that resemble IP rights, like trade secrets or state
patents. But for state anti-patent law, the Intellectual Property Clause has direct
application. In other words, to ride on the Court’s statement in Goldstein,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 does, “by its own force” preempt—if not all state
anti-patent laws—a large number of them. And the legal test to be applied in
assessing whether a given state anti-patent law is preempted revolves around the
language of the Intellectual Property Clause.
We can observe this initially by looking at the language of the Clause itself.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”42
True, the Intellectual Property clause does not expressly say anything about
states ability to restrict patents. It does, though, state that Congress has power
to “secure” the exclusive rights of an inventor in his or her discovery.
Logically, then, if the state interferes with a patent after Congress has “secured”
it—that is, by sanctioning the Patent Office to grant a patent under the Patent
Act—this creates a direct collision with federal power.
The clearest analogy is to a piece of federal property. If the federal
government creates a property right and grants it to an individual, surely a state
cannot then reduce the scope of that property right or alter the terms on which
it can be enforced, at least not without significant restrictions. Historically,
courts made the “federal property” analogy quite explicitly. They recognized
this distinction between state laws that replace or supplement federal patents,
on the one hand, and state laws that burden federal patents, on the other.43 In
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the Supreme Court struck down a Maryland law
that taxed promissory notes issued by a branch of the federal bank.44 “[T]he
power to tax,” Chief Justice Marshall famously stated, “involves the power to
destroy; [and] the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to
create.”45 A state tax on a bank chartered by the national government, Marshall
wrote, was “hostile to, and incompatible” with Congress’s power “to create and
to preserve” the bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause.46 To illustrate
41

Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ed., 2013).

AND THE COMMON Law 265 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 426 (1819). See also discussion of the case and analysis
in Nelson, supra note 4, at 268–72.
45 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 431.
46 Id. at 426.
43
44
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this point, Marshall analogized to federal patent rights issued by the Patent
Office, stating in dicta that surely states could not tax federal patent rights once
they had been “secured” by Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.47
Following McCulloch, courts thereafter prohibited states from taxing federal
patent rights,48 and also prohibited states from passing laws to regulate patent
rights, such as laws mandating that patentees register their patents with the state
before selling them in the jurisdiction. In Ex parte Robinson (1870), one of the
earliest cases addressing such a law, an Indiana appeals court struck down an act
called “An act to regulate the sale of patent rights and to prevent frauds in
connection therewith.”49 Thereafter, other courts followed suit. For example,
in Cranson v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Michigan struck down Michigan’s
registration statute, concluding that even if regulations were necessary to
prevent patent fraud,50 “[t]he measure of that protection, and its conditions,
cannot be fixed by any power but Congress.”51 To the extent the Patent Act suffered
from “abuses or defects,” the “remedy” must be congressional “revision of its
own laws. It is not competent for state statutes to deal with them, or to revise
the national policy.”52
Starting around 1878, a circuit split emerged, with some courts beginning to
uphold state anti-patent laws despite Article I, Section 8, Clause 8’s delegation
of authority to Congress to “secure” patent rights.53 After decades of
disagreement among state courts on the constitutionality of these laws, the
Supreme Court finally settled once and for all in Allen v. Riley (1906) that,
notwithstanding the Intellectual Property Clause, states had some degree of
authority to create restrictions on patent transfers in their jurisdiction for the
purposes of preventing fraud, but not unlimited authority.54
47 Id. at 432 (“If the states may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the
execution of its powers . . . they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail;
they may tax the mint; they may tax patent right. . . . This was not intended by the American
people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the states.”).
48 Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Bd. of Assessors of Brooklyn, 51 N.E. 269, 270 (1898)
(“[P]atent rights being created under the Federal Constitution and laws for a federal purpose, the
states are without the right to interfere with them. The right to tax a federal agency constitutes a
right to interfere with, to obstruct, and even to destroy the agency itself, for conceding the right
of the state to tax at all, then it may tax to the point of destruction.”).
49 Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 963.
50 Cranson v. Smith, 37 Mich. 309, 312 (1877).
51 Id. (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 312–13.
53 See, e.g., Haskell v. Jones, 86 Pa. 173, 173 (1878) (“The Act of April 12th 1872, regulating the
execution and transfer of notes given for patent rights, is not in conflict with art. 1, sect. 8, of the
Constitution of the United States.”).
54 Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 355 (1906).
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In a majority opinion written by Justice Peckham, the Supreme Court held
that the Intellectual Property Clause did not fully divest states of authority to
pass laws to protect citizens from patent frauds, so long as the state law did not
impose a burden on patentees that was “so great . . . as to be regarded as
oppressive or unreasonable.”55 Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, states could
never act in a way that “would result in a prohibition of the sale of this species
of property within its borders” and thereby “nullify the laws of Congress which
regulate its transfer, and destroy the power conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution. Such a statute would not be a reasonable exercise of the powers
of the state.”56
Allen’s “reasonableness” standard is essentially a balancing test that requires
courts to balance the state’s interest in regulating patents against the burden on
the federal right. An analogy can be drawn to the Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, where courts balance the state’s interest in passing a law against the
burden the law places on interstate commerce.57 A more controversial analogy
is to the “undue burden” test the Supreme Court uses in “fundamental rights”
litigation to assess whether a state, in pursuing its own interests, has
unconstitutionally undermined a fundamental right.58
The Allen test has three prongs. First, the state law must serve a valid
purpose—that is, be designed to combat what the Allen court termed a “wellknown evil,” such as a state’s desire to combat meritless assertions of patents
for the purpose of obtaining a forced license fee.59 Second, the law must not
impose an “oppressive or unreasonable” burden on the patentee’s ability to
enforce the patent—meaning that the costs of patentee compliance with the
state law must not be too great.60 Third, if the cost imposed on patentees is far
too great in light of the harm the state seeks to combat, the law is
unconstitutional.61 If not, it is constitutional.

Id. at 357.
Id. at 355 (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 2 Biss. 309, Fed. Cas. No. 11,932 (1870)).
57 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See discussion of the Dormant
Commerce Clause balancing in Hrdy, supra note 13, at 542.
58 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–75 (1992) (“Only where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make [the decision to terminate or
continue her pregnancy before viability] does the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. . . . In our view, the undue burden standard is the
appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected
liberty.”).
59 203 U.S. at 356.
60 Id. at 355–57.
61 203 U.S. at 357.
55
56
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For example, in Allen, the court found that Kansas’s registration statute had
the purpose of “checking a well-known evil” as it was designed “to prevent, so
far as possible, fraud and imposition in regard to the sales of rights under
patents.”62 The Court also found that the cost of compliance that the law
imposed on patentees was not unduly great in light of the state’s goal.
Specifically, the Court found, “[t]he expense of filing copies of the patent and
the making of affidavits in the various counties of the State in which the owner
of the rights desired to deal with them is not so great in our judgment as to be
regarded as oppressive or unreasonable.”63
Importantly, passing the constitutional standard—not imposing an
“oppressive” or “unreasonable” burden on the patent right—does not mean a
state law is not preempted. Rather, the court must also address whether the
state law directly conflicts with some specific provision of the Patent Act. For
instance, in Allen, the Court assessed whether the Kansas law at issue, requiring
registering a patent with the state before assigning the patent, conflicted with a
provision of the Patent Act authorizing written assignments and providing that
those assignments would be void as against subsequent purchasers unless
recorded in the federal Patent Office. (Today, this is 35 U.S.C. § 261.) The
Allen Court found that no conflict existed because all the provision said was
that “every patent, or interest therein, shall be assignable in writing, leaving to
the various states the power to provide for the safeguarding of the interests of
those dealing with the assumed owner of a patent, or his assignee.”64
VII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ERROR
Modern courts, and particularly the Federal Circuit, have lost sight of the
older, and I think clearer, way of seeing things. Instead of employing the
Intellectual Property Clause and assessing the burden a state places on the
exclusive right “secured” under Article I, the Federal Circuit employs statutory
preemption, which assesses whether the legislature has preempted a state law or
an entire “field” state law, either expressly or impliedly.65 Since the Patent Act
has no express preemption provision, the Federal Circuit uses “implied
conflict” preemption, which requires courts to perform an open-ended analysis
of whether a state law interferes with the “purposes and objectives” of federal
patent law. If it does so interfere then—like the “patent-like” law in Bonito
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356–57.
64 See id. at 352, 356 (discussing argument that Kanas law conflicted with what was then REV.
STAT. § 4898 U.S. Comp. State. 1901).
65 Nelson, supra note 4, at 226–29 (discussing taxonomy Supreme Court uses for preemption).
62
63
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Boats—it is preempted. If it does not interfere then—like the trade secret
statute in Kewanee—it is not preempted.
The Federal Circuit delineated this standard in a series of cases in the 1980s
and 1990s: Concrete Unlimited, Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc.,66 Abbott Labs. v. Brennan,67
Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp.,68 and Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design,
Inc.69 The Federal Circuit most fully discussed patent law’s preemptive effect on
state anti-patent law in Dow, where it held that implied conflict preemption
(not, for instance, “field” preemption) is the proper standard to apply to a state
anti-patent law, and intuited that this standard leaves intact many kinds of state
claims leveled against patentees.70
The facts of the Dow case are as follows.71 Patentee Exxon threatened Dow’s
customers with patent infringement, both in-person and by letter. Anticipating it
would be sued, Dow filed an action against Exxon in federal district court seeking
a declaratory judgment that Dow’s technology did not infringe the patent and that
in any event, the patent was invalid and unenforceable. Dow also brought a state
law unfair competition claim against Exxon, the gist of which was that Exxon had
made unfounded assertions of patent infringement against Dow’s customers and
that Dow was harmed by this activity. Dow also contended Exxon’s patent was
66 776 F.2d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing district court and preempting a state unfair
competition claim based on patentee “taking business away from the Defendant by threats and
infringement actions based on the fraudulently obtained patent” when the patentee was found not to
have engaged in inequitable conduct even though the patent was held to be invalid for obviousness).
67 952 F.2d 1346, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (preempting a state tort abuse of process claim
based on a patent holder’s conduct before the PTO as an “inappropriate collateral intrusion on
the regulatory procedures of the PTO” and “contrary to Congress’ preemptive regulation in the
area of patent law” and concluding that such claim is “not remediable by state action in tort, at
least unless it is shown that the entire federal agency action was a ‘sham.’ ” (quoting E.R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961) (narrowly
construing the Sherman Act to avoid a conflict with the First Amendment’s Petition Clause))).
68 139 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that state common law claims which implicate
patent law issues, such as state claims that address fraudulent conduct before the patent office, are
not necessarily preempted “provided the state law cause of action includes additional elements
not found in the federal patent law cause of action and is not an impermissible attempt to offer
patent-like protection to subject matter addressed by federal law”).
69 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal patent law bars the imposition of liability for
conduct before the PTO unless the plaintiff can show that the patent holder’s conduct amounted to
fraud or rendered the patent application process a sham.”), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus.,
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144)).
70 Dow, 139 F.3d at 1475 (“Under the standard mandated by the Supreme Court, the state law
cause of action at issue here does not present an ‘obstacle’ to the execution and accomplishment
of the patent laws. . . . It is difficult to fathom how such a state law cause of action could have any
discernible effect on the incentive to invent, the full disclosure of ideas, or the principle that ideas
in the public domain remain in the public domain.”).
71 These facts come from the Federal Circuit’s summary on appeal. Id. at 1471–72.
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unenforceable as a matter of federal patent law because Exxon had obtained the
patent by inequitable conduct before the PTO.72
Thereafter, Exxon abandoned its patent infringement case against Dow,
filing a “Statement of Non-Liability” with the district court that gave Dow and
its customers, at no cost, perpetual immunity from suit for infringement of the
patent.73 This made Dow’s request for declaratory judgment moot. All that
was left was the state law unfair competition claim. Dow wanted to at least
come away with some form of compensation for the patentee’s harassing acts.
State law, but not federal law, presented this possibility now that the patentee
had dropped its infringement claim.
The Federal Circuit was therefore presented with a conundrum. Should
defendant Dow’s remedy be limited to federal patent law? Or should it be able
to obtain relief under state law, and potentially (once all federal claims were
dismissed), in state court? The analogy under the state anti-patent laws we have
seen thus far—that is, the registration statutes passed by states in the nineteenth
century—would be Exxon attempting to enforce its patent in the jurisdiction
against Dow’s customers without first registering its patent with the state.
To answer this question, the Federal Circuit drew on Kewanee v. Bicron and
other cases in which the Supreme Court has assessed whether state “IP-like”
rights such as trade secrets conflict with federal patent law’s purposes and
objectives to promote innovation and disclosure and to retain the integrity of the
public domain.74 Applying this case law, the Federal Circuit concluded that like in
the trade secrets context, the proper preemption test was implied conflict, not
field preemption.75 Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, regardless of whether
the state law at issue is an “IP-like” incentive like a trade secret or a state common
law claim asserted against a harassing patentee, the law should not be preempted
unless it conflicts with the Court’s understanding of Congress’s “purposes and
objectives” in passing the Patent Act—to promote innovation and disclosure, and

Id. at 1472.
Id.
74 139 F.3d at 1473–75.
75 Id. at 1471–79. In Hunter, the court elaborated:
there is no reason to believe that the clear and manifest purpose of Congress
was for federal patent law to occupy exclusively the field pertaining to state
unfair competition law. Because of the lack of such congressional intent, in
conjunction with the underlying presumption disfavoring preemption, there is
no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial
question of federal patent law.
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d. 1318, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing
Dow, 139 F.3d at 1471–79).
72
73
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to keep known knowledge in the public domain.76 This is the case even though
the IP Clause gives Congress power to grant patents, and even though a state law,
such as a counterclaim brought against a patentee, directly weakens that federallysecured right. In the Dow case itself, the majority of the Federal Circuit
determined that “[u]nder the standard mandated by the Supreme Court, the state
law cause of action at issue here”—a counterclaim alleging that Exxon made
frivolous assertions of infringement against Dow’s clients—does not present an
“obstacle” to the execution and accomplishment of the patent laws.”77
Importantly, in so holding the Court did not assess the cost that the state
counterclaim would place on the patentee. It only assessed whether the law
conflicted with congressional goals—which in the court’s view it did not, largely
because the law did not interfere with the public domain.78 That analysis seems
highly unsuited to the context given that only state exclusive rights that prevent
copying of known subject matter will do that.
This result may not be wrong—maybe the state law counterclaim did not
create an undue burden on the Exxon patent. My point here is that the
doctrines the Federal Circuit uses to ask this question are wrong. While
Supreme Court case law addressing implied Congressional preemption of state
“IP-like” rights is theoretically relevant, it does not address the very different
issue implicated by the new state laws: whether state law can restrain the
enforcement of federal patents. As I explained above, the two scenarios are in
fact quite different. In the first circumstance, states indirectly interfere with
federal patents when they supply state-level alternatives that might theoretically
lead to less investment in innovating and disclosing under the Patent Act.79 But
in the latter scenario, states interfere with federal patents quite directly by
restricting patentees’ ability to enforce their patents against potential infringers
or sell or license their rights before infringement occurs.
76 Dow, 139 F.3d at 1474 (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480). In the Federal Circuit’s reading of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Kewanee, these objectives are “threefold: providing an incentive to invent,
promoting the full disclosure of inventions, and ensuring that ‘that which is in the public domain
cannot be removed therefrom by action of the States.’ ” Id. (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480–81).
77 Id.
78 Id.; see also Hunter, 153 F.3d at 1333 (“In Dow Chemical, we understood the Supreme Court
precedent to preempt state laws that ‘seek to offer patent-like protection to intellectual property
inconsistent with the federal scheme.’ ”).
79 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 161 (“[W]e cannot dismiss as hypothetical the possibility that [the
state’s “patent-like” rights] will become a significant competitor to the federal patent laws,
offering investors similar protection without the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required
by the federal statute. The prospect of all 50 States establishing similar protections for preferred
industries . . . could pose a substantial threat to the patent system’s ability to accomplish its
mission of promoting progress in the useful arts.”).
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Judge Lourie noted this difference in his dissent in Dow. Unlike the
majority, Lourie would have held that the state law was preempted as applied,
because it permitted imposing liability against a patentee for enforcing a patent
and that state liability effectively duplicated federal liability for engaging in
inequitable conduct.80 In his dissent, Lourie observed that the Supreme Court
implied conflict preemption case law used by the majority was completely
inapposite because it involved “an alternative form of intellectual property protection or
enforcement of a contract, rather than an attack on the enforceability (or validity) of a patent
which is basically at issue here.”81
The majority did not heed Lourie’s dissent and went on in Hunter to confirm
its view that federal patent law does not preempt all state torts that create liability
for patentee misconduct. “To avoid this result,” the Federal Circuit wrote in
Hunter, “it has been suggested that we should preempt all state law torts premised
on federal patent law.82 We believe, however, that such an outcome would cause
more harm to federal-state relations than the result here.”83
VIII. DOCTRINAL DISPLACEMENT
I am not arguing that we should preempt all state laws premised on federal
patent law or all state unfair competition claims wielded against state patentees.
However, I am arguing that the whole line of case law stemming from Dow is
incorrect, and the modern implied conflict preemption rule is doctrinally and
conceptually flawed. It is derived from Supreme Court case law assessing
preemption of state innovation incentives, which only indirectly interfere with
patents, not state laws that directly and intentionally weaken patents. Moreover,
at a policy level, it is effectively a rubber stamp for state law liability against
patentees: the implied conflict preemption standard is in theory very easy for a
state law to meet. Almost any state regulation can be deemed in accordance
with patent law’s goals.
As shown, implied conflict preemption is very different from how courts
addressed state regulation of patent enforcement historically. The question
then was not whether state law conflicted with the goals of federal patent law; it
was the degree to which state law conflicted with the patent right itself.
Because the Intellectual Property Clause gives the federal government authority
139 F.3d at 1474.
Id. at 1480 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
82 Hunter, 153 F.3d at 1337–38 (citing Dow, 144 F.3d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Lourie, J.,
joined by Newman and Rader, JJ.) (dissenting from an order declining a suggestion for rehearing
in banc)).
83 Id. at 1338.
80
81
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to secure “exclusive rights” in inventions, the reasoning goes, states cannot
undermine this power by passing laws that work in contravention of these
rights once they had been secured. Under Allen, a conflict exists if the state
places an “unreasonable” burden on the patent right (or otherwise creates a
direct conflict with some provision of the Patent Act).
Perhaps precisely because it makes little doctrinal or policy sense, the
Federal Circuit has abandoned its conflict preemption approach and
supplemented it with the First Amendment. As Professor Paul Gugliuzza has
discussed, the Federal Circuit has supplemented its patent preemption decisions
with an analysis of whether state laws that restrict patent enforcement violate
the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.84 Drawing on the so-called NoerrPennington doctrine, used to limit antitrust liability for certain anticompetitive
actions taken in the course of “petitioning” the government,85 the Federal
Circuit has derived a rigid two-part test that requires assessing both the
objective merits of the patentee’s assertion of infringement and the patentee’s
subjective motives in making the assertion.86
In Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.,87 the Federal Circuit
cited antitrust law cases, including the Supreme Court’s holding in Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., which immunized a
copyright plaintiff from antitrust liability under Noerr-Pennington.88 The Federal
Circuit explained its rule that state laws that seek to penalize blameworthy
conduct taken in the course of enforcing a patent would not be upheld as
applied unless the patent is “obviously invalid” or “plainly not infringed.”89
This outcome, the court stated, was required by “both federal patent
preemption and the First Amendment.”90
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s reading of Petitioning Immunity essentially
preempts any state law that creates liability for enforcing a patent that is not
“obviously invalid” or “plainly not infringed.”91 The upshot for patentees is
robust protection from state law liability. “[S]ince Globetrotter,” Gugliuzza
Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1616.
See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis
and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 81 (1977). But see David
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning, and the First
Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 399–400 (1994) (arguing that the Sherman Act should
not be construed to prevent liability for anticompetitive actions made in the course of petitioning).
86 Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1625.
87 362 F.3d 301 at 1375–77.
88 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993).
89 Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1377.
90 Id. at 1375–77.
91 Id. at 1375.
84
85
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recounts, “the Federal Circuit has barred the state law claims in all but one case
raising the issue.”92
So what is the problem? The Federal Circuit is not entirely unreasonable in
its usage of this Petitioning Immunity doctrine as applied to state anti-patent
law. The First Amendment Petition Clause obviously applies to states. That
said, there are some legal problems here. The first is that Noerr-Pennington
immunity, like antitrust law’s state action doctrine, comes from the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act, which in the Court’s view must be
construed narrowly to avoid a conflict with the Petition Clause.93 There is no
inherent reason this doctrine could not be applied to state laws as well—
assuming bringing a patent suit is a “petition,” which the Supreme Court case
law suggests it is.94 But the Federal Circuit has not explicitly performed this
narrowing construction of state law or at least has not been particularly clear
about what it is doing. Second, the Federal Circuit seems to have an
exceptionally strong idea about how much protection the Petition Clause
provides to a petitioner—something the Supreme Court recently pointed out in
Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., where it addressed the Federal
Circuit’s protective rule for awarding damages against a losing patent plaintiff.95
Third, the focus of Petitioning Immunity analysis is ill-suited to this situation—
where a state (or federal) law seeks to impose liability for pre-litigation conduct,
partly in order to save potential defendants the costs of going to court. The test
asks courts to assess the objective merits of a patent assertion claim. Courts
simply cannot reasonably do this prior to infringement. Lastly, relying on the
First Amendment rather than patent preemption raises a significant policy issue,
clearly identified by Gugliuzza— that the First Amendment would limit federal
regulation of patents as well.96
The irony here is that the impact of Noerr-Pennington immunity—stricter
preemption of state law—is not dissimilar to the impact of applying the historic
preemption rule under the Intellectual Property Clause. In effect, the Federal

Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1627, n.297 (citing cases).
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)
(narrowly construing the Sherman Act to avoid a conflict with the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause). On petitioning immunity generally, see Fischel, supra note 85, at 80–81. But see McGowan
& Lemley, supra note 85, at 293 (arguing that the Sherman Act should not be construed to prevent
liability for anticompetitive actions made in the course of petitioning).
94 See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972).
95 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756–57 (2014)
(casting doubt on Federal Circuit’s suggestion that the Petition Clause significantly limits courts
ability to impose attorney’s fees on losing patentees).
96 See Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1586.
92
93
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Circuit has unwittingly displaced the Intellectual Property Clause’s preemptive
effect with Petitioning Immunity under the First Amendment.97
Again, there is no inherent reason the Federal Circuit cannot use the First
Amendment to address this issue instead of the Intellectual Property Clause.
But along with the legal and policy issues stated above, my larger problem with
Noerr-Pennington is that it is simply unnecessary. The court should just be using
preemption under the Intellectual Property Clause instead.
IX. CONCLUSION
I am not arguing that courts should preempt all state laws that impede
enforcement of federal patents. To the contrary, I am arguing that the Federal
Circuit’s approach to preemption of these laws—specifically, the whole line of
case law stemming from Dow—is wrong. These cases mandate that courts seek
signs of implicit congressional intent to preempt a given state law. This rule
stems from case law addressing state patent-like rights and is doctrinally and
conceptually flawed. As a matter of policy, it allows courts to uphold state antipatent laws largely at their discretion so long as those anti-patent laws do not
create exclusive rights against the world or remove known subject matter from
the public domain—which they essentially never do. Moreover, as Gugliuzza
has shown, the Federal Circuit has effectively displaced this rule with First
Amendment Petitioning Immunity, which has its own problems—not least of
which that it applies to federal as well as state attempts to regulate of patent.98
The Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, could solve these
problems by returning to the Intellectual Property Clause, rather than
congressional intent or the First Amendment, as the source of preemption with
respect to state anti-patent laws. When states weaken patents, they interfere
quite directly with a federally “secured” constitutional right. In these
circumstances, courts should ask whether the state law imposes a burden on the
federal patent—that is, creates compliance costs for patentees—that are
unreasonably great in light of the problem the state seeks to combat.

97 David L. Schwartz has discussed the issue of doctrinal displacement: where courts displace
one doctrine with another. Schwartz gave the example of the Federal Circuit displacing the
“doctrine of equivalents” with claim construction as the vehicle for assessing whether products
that are not literally infringing of the patentee’s claims are nonetheless infringing. See David L.
Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011).
98 See Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1684–86.
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